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EIGHTEEN YEARS OLD AND READY FOR
DRIVING, CIGARETTES AND WAR, BUT NOT
BASKETBALL: WHY THE NBA IS COMMITTING
A FOUL ON THE AGE ELIGIBILITY RULE
BRIAN LOVELL
INTRODUCTION
Brandon Jennings grew up near Los Angeles California, "where hoops
skills bring girls, hype and carte blanche."' The six foot one inch, 170
pound guard, from Oak Hill Academy High School, was averaging, 32.7
points, 7.4 assists, and 5.1 rebounds for each game. With such an
incredible performance as a high school athlete, he received the Naismith
Prep Player of the Year award, Gatorade Player of the Year award, and EA
Sports Player of the Year award and led his team to a record of forty-one
wins and only one loss. In June of 2008, Jennings was listed anywhere
from the top prospect in the nation to the fourth ranked prospect. The only
obstacle that stood in Brandon Jennings' way was that he was eighteen
years old. Due to the National Basketball Association's (NBA) collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), Brandon Jennings was forced to wait until
his nineteenth birthday in order to obtain gainful employment in the NBA,
the Mecca of professional basketball. 2 Thus, instead of following the trend
of the "one and done year on campus" Brandon Jennings decided that he
would take a different path, possibly changing the landscape of college
basketball, and potentially the trend of high school players looking to play
in the NBA.3 Brandon Jennings went overseas and signed a 1.65 million
I See Chris Broussard, Exchange Student: The First American to go Prep to Pro by way of Europe,
Brandon Jennings getting quite an education overseas, ESPN (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?id=3715746 ("Everything is tiny. The bed looks like it could
be palmed by Shaq. The room is the size of a Hummer. The hotel looks like a town house.").
2 See Collective Bargaining Agreement between NBA Representatives and National Basketball
Association Players' Association art. X, § (1)(b)(ii) (2005),
http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20X.pdf, see also CBA 101 Highlights of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NBA and NBPA § VI (A)(2) (2010),
http://www.nba.com/.element/mp3/2.0/sect/podcastmp3/PDF/CBAl01.pdf.
3 See Dwight Jaynes, Brandon Jennings may change the landscape of college basketball, DWIGHT
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dollar deal with Virtus Roma, a professional basketball team in Europe.4
For a high school legend from Los Angeles, Jennings experienced quite a
culture shock, including tiny living quarters. 5 This would be where
Brandon Jennings commenced his basketball career. 6 The high school all
star gained an inordinate amount of experience playing overseas, and was
paid doing it as well. 7 The high school phenom's lackadaisical demeanor
he carried throughout his high school days was not accepted in the Euro-
league, and his coach made sure of that.8 Coach Jasmin Respesa kicked
Jennings out of practice and would get in Jennings' face, displaying his
disgust.9 However, after being kicked out of practice, Brandon Jennings'
attitude changed winning him respect in the locker room and pushing him
to play harder than ever before.' 0 An NBA General Manager explained that
"[p]laying in Europe with grown men who are better than him is going to
help him mature as a player, and he [is] definitely a lottery pick in '09".11
Even Brandon Jennings noticed the difference, explaining, "[w]hen you're
the man in high school, you can do whatever you want; [t]his is something
new for me, especially playing for a coach who's real controlling and
doesn't take no stuff."12 Although the NBA currently does not have to
worry about losing players to other leagues, such as those in Europe,
because the NBA is the most prolific league for basketball in the world, it
may have to worry about their role in the lives of these potential NBA stars,
and the legal ramifications of the eligibility rule.
This Note will argue against the NBA's draft eligibility rule, which
requires an individual to be nineteen years of age to play even though in
most states a minor can be employed in other jobs at the age of sixteen.
JAYNES (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.dwightjaynes.com/brandon-jennings-may-change-the-landscape-
of-college-basketball; see also Pete Thamel, At 19, Plotting New Path to N.B.A., via Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/sports/basketball/05jennings.html?ref-brandonjennings.
4 See Jaynes, supra note 3; see also Joel McLean, Global Economic Crush Forces Players Home
From Europe PASPN (Jan. 14, 2009), http://paspn.net/default.asp?p=1 2&stld=8142757.
5 See Broussard, supra note 1; see also Aldo Ciummo, Jennings, stop for the NBA, "Totti who?,"
WORD PRESS (Oct. 17, 2008), http://.skapegoat.wordpress.com/2008/10/17/sportjennings-fermata-per-
la-nba-%C2%ABtotti-who%C2%BB/.
6 See Broussard, supra note 1; see also Thamel, supra note 3.
7 See Broussard, supra note 1 (stating "[t]his is great preparation, because it's a big learning
experience over here"); see also Thamel, supra note 3 (discussing Jennings' improvements as a player).
8 See Broussard, supra note 1 (explaining that Coach Jasmin Repesa, after watching Jennings
during drills, had seen enough, and made it a point to kick Jennings out of practice); see also Thamel,
supra note 3 (conferring when Jennings' was removed from practice).
9 See Broussard, supra note 1; see also Thamel, supra note 3.
10 See Broussard, supra note I (quoting Jennings' mom saying, "I can see that Brandon's learning
so much here. He didn't used to play this hard"); see also Thamel, supra note 3.
11 Broussard, supra note 1.
12 Id.
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Meanwhile, children even younger than sixteen can work under certain
exceptions in certain states. 13
Part I of this Note will discuss the prior challenges made against the
NBA's age restriction, its collective bargaining process, and introduce the
ideas of reverse age discrimination, and equal protection. This part will
provide what is included in the collective bargaining agreement and the
first challenge against the collective bargaining agreement and how it
failed. Part I will additionally discuss a challenge against the NBA, which
was successful because there was no collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) in place. Furthermore, it will also establish an important aspect of
the CBA, in that future employees/players are bound to the agreement,
without having a say in the matter. Lastly, it will compare the NBA's
eligibility rule to the eligibility rule that the National Football League
(NFL) imposes on teenage athletes, as seen through the recent case of
Clarett v. NFL.14
Part II will assert the public policy concerns and issues of the NBA's
rule requiring individuals to be at least nineteen years of age to be
employed as professional basketball players. This Part suggests that when
compared to other sports, the NBA's age eligibility requirement is
completely arbitrary. Furthermore, due to the rise of dissatisfaction from
players, former players and established government figures, the NBA is in
need of a new solution.
Part III of this Note will set forth two areas of law which possibly could,
and should, give these extraordinarily talented players an opportunity to
seek legal remedy for being denied their right to gainful employment. The
first area of law involves reverse age discrimination with respect to the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA). While the ADEA focuses
on employment discrimination of those over the age of fortyl5, this Note
will focus on the relatively new claim of Reverse Age Discrimination.16
Secondly, this Note will contend that each high school player seeking to
play in the NBA is being denied equal protection of the law, making the
13 See COLo. REV. STAT. § 8-12-105(1) to (5) (2009) (allowing minors over the age of fourteen to
be employed); see also CODE OF ALA. § 25-8-33 (2011) (allowing any person 14 or 15 to be employed
outside school hours).
14 See generally Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
15 See 29 U.S.C.S. § 631(a) (2010).
16 See generally Bergen v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188 (1999); see also Rebecca L. Ennis, General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline: Shrinking the Realm of Possibility for Reverse Age
Discrimination Suits, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 753 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court's ruling with
regards to reverse age discrimination under the ADEA).
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NBA's draft eligibility rules unconstitutional. 17
Part IV will argue for more rights for the future employees of the NBA
in collective bargaining agreements, and will call for a vast change in the
NBA's eligibility rules and the NBA draft.
I. THE NBA's COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AND DRAFT
ELIGIBILITY CHALLENGES
A. The NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement
The NBA collective bargaining agreement is the primary instrument that
holds teenage basketball players from asserting an anti-trust claim against
the NBA, and also sets forth the rules and regulations of the league. "The
draft... [is] not, however, the product solely of an agreement among
horizontal competitors but [is] embodied in a collective agreement between
the employer or employers and a labor organization reached through
procedures mandated by federal labor legislation."' 8 The NBA collective
bargaining agreement is negotiated by NBA representatives, including the
Commissioner, various owners, attorneys and financial experts, who
attempt to get the best deal possible for the owners. Also included in the
process are the player representatives, including the Executive Committee
and a negotiating committee, which represent the players in the NBA, and
try to obtain the best deal possible for all the players.19 These collective
bargaining agreements are negotiated approximately every six years, and
all players are encouraged to participate. 20 The NBA likes to see itself as a
"democratic organization," soliciting the views of all the players, ultimately
allowing all players to vote on the agreement. 21 This arrangement of the
NBA players association first arose in 1964, when players threatened not to
17 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18 Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
19 See David Stem, Billy Hunter Interview, INSIDE HooPs (June 22, 2005),
http://www.insidehoops.com/hunter-interview-062205.shtml; see also NBA 's collective bargaining
agreement finalized and signed, USA TODAY (July 30, 2005),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2005-07-30-cba-finalizedx.htm.
20 See David Stem, Billy Hunter Interview, INSIDE Hoops (June 22, 2005),
http://www.insidehoops.com/hunter-interview-062205.shtml; see also NBA 's collective bargaining
agreement finalized and signed, USA TODAY (July 30, 2005),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2005-07-30-cba-finalizedx.htm.
21 LeBron James and the NBA CBA, FSK'S GUIDE TO REALITY (June 30, 2010),
http://fskrealityguide.blogspot.com/2010/06/lebron-james-and-nba-cba.html; see Adonal Foyle, So
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play in the first televised NBA All-Star Game.22 The rationale of the CBA
is that since the views of both the players' representatives, and the NBA
representatives are solicited, then the resulting agreement will be exempt
from anti-trust claims.
B. Wood v. NBA
The potential NBA players seeking employment with the NBA have no
say in the CBA. Wood v. NBA shows that those outside of the agreement
are bound to that agreement. 23 There, Leon Wood, a guard from California
State University, brought an antitrust action against the NBA and certain
provisions of the CBA dealing with the salary cap, the draft, and player
corporations. 24 Among Wood's many arguments, he asserted that the rules
created through the collective bargaining agreement were illegal because it
affects those "outside the bargaining unit."25 However, the second circuit
held that this is a common consequence of collective agreements in all
industries. 26 Furthermore, the court noted that the National Labor Relations
Act defines employee in a way that includes those working outside the
bargaining unit.27 Therefore, the high school athletes who seek
employment with the NBA, will have no say in what is agreed upon as to
the age eligibility rules, and can only wait and hope that the rules change.
C. Haywood v. National Basketball Assn.
When no CBA is in place, it is possible for a potential NBA player to
succeed in asserting an anti-trust action. In 1971, the rules of the NBA
required a college player to wait four years after graduating from high
22 About The NBPA, NBPA.ORG, http://www.nbpa.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 29, 2011); LISA
P. MASTERALEXIS, CAROL A. BARR & MARY HUMs, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SPORT
MANAGEMENT 229 (4th ed. 2011).
23 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 960 (stating "[tihe National Labor Relations Act explicitly defines
'employee' in a way that includes workers outside the bargaining unit." (quoting 29 U.S.C. §152[3]
[2010])).
24 See id. at 956.
25 See id at 960 (noting that Wood believed that both the salary cap and the draft impacted the
employees outside the bargaining agreement).
26 See id. at 960; see also Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. N.L.R.B. 379 U.S. 203, 210-15 (1964);
Merk v. Jewel 848 F.2d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating "union and employer therefore may agree that
employees hired in the future, who by definition are not yet members of the bargaining unit, will
receive lower pay"); N.L.R.B. v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir.
1966) (articulating that "[t]he duty to bargain is a continuing one, and a union may legitimately bargain
over wages and conditions of employment which will affect employees who are to be hired in the
future.").
27 See 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (2010) (noting that the term employee includes any employee, and not
limited to the employees of a particular employer).
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school in order to be drafted. 28 In Haywood, the plaintiff, Spencer
Haywood, played with the 1968 Olympic team, then went to college,
ultimately landing a contract with the rival American Basketball
Association (ABA).29 Haywood repudiated his contract with the ABA, and
signed with the Seattle Supersonics at the age of 21.30 However, the
signing occurred less than four years after Haywood's high school class
had graduated, leaving him ineligible for the draft.31 After the NBA
threatened to invalidate his contract and threatened the Supersonics with
various sanctions, Haywood brought an anti-trust action against the NBA.32
The Court held that if Haywood is denied the right to play for Seattle, he
will "suffer irreparable injury in that a substantial part of his playing career
will have been dissipated, his physical condition, skills and coordination
will deteriorate from lack of high level competition, his public acceptance
as a super star will diminish to the detriment of his career." 33 The Court
further stated that the NBA preventing him from playing would cause him
"great injustice." 34 This ruling paved the way for greats such as Magic
Johnson, Michael Jordan, Kobe Bryant, and LeBron James to leave college
early, or not attend at all.35
D. The CBA's First Challenge
The CBA prevents players from asserting an anti-trust claim against the
NBA. The representatives of both the NBA and the players attempt to get
the best deal for their sides, but the ultimate agreement does not always
leave each party satisfied. At the expiration of the first Collective
28 See Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Assn., 401 U.S. 1204, 1204 (1971); see also Denver Rockets
v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (referencing the by-laws of the
National Basketball Association).
29 See Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1204.
30 Id. at 1205.
31 Id.
32 See id. (alleging that this is a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
33 Id; see generally Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt, 325 F. Supp 1049 (D. Cal. 1971) (holding
that the athlete had demonstrated irreparable harm and a likelihood of success, rendered the NBA's
draft an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint on the right of the athlete and other potential NBA players);
see also Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1326 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that the
probability of the 19 year old amateur Canadian hockey player's ultimate success was a virtual
certainty, and he could not be prohibited from playing professional hockey for any team in the
association).
34 See Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205.
35 See Erik Brady, Haywood Sued NBA, Paving Way for Underclassmen to Enter Draft, USA
TODAY (May 12, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2009-05-12-spencer-
haywood N.htm; see also Brian Shaffer, Comment, The NBA's Age Requirement Shoots and Misses:
How the Non-Statutory Exemption Produces Inequitable Results for High School Basketball Stars, 48
SANTA CLARA L. REv., 681, 684-685 (2008).
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Bargaining Agreement between both the players and the owners, fourteen
NBA players filed a class action lawsuit in Robertson v. NBA, challenging
the NBA's rules pertaining to the college draft, the uniform contract, the
reserve clause, boycotts, and asserting that the NBA was prohibiting
players from playing in any rival league. 36 The claim against the college
draft did not focus on age eligibility, but did state that it was "designed to
prevent competition among member NBA clubs for what is virtually the
exclusive source of basketball talent in the country." 37 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that although the
practices complained of were per se violations of the Sherman Act, 38 the
NBA practices were exempt because of collective bargaining. 39 It is,
therefore, a fundamental principle of federal labor law that employees can
eliminate competition among themselves through a "governmentally
supervised majority vote selecting an exclusive bargaining
representative." 40 Thus, the legal avenue of suing under anti-trust laws will
most likely be unsuccessful when a collective bargaining agreement is
present.
E. Clarett v NFL
The most recent case showing that an anti-trust claim against age
eligibility will most likely be unsuccessful is Clarett v NFL.41 Clarett is
most relevant because similar to the NBA, the NFL has a controversial age
limitation on who can enter the draft, and likely the NBA's justification for
their draft eligibility rules would be similar to that of the NFL's in the
Clarett case. 42 Maurice Clarrett was a running back for the Ohio State
University Buckeyes (OSU).43 Similar to Brandon Jennings, Clarett was a
36 See Ron Flatter, Oscar Defined the Triple Double, ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/sportscentury/features/00016428.html_(last visited Sept. 29, 2011); see generally
Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n., 389 F. Supp 867, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
37 Robertson, 389 F. Supp at 874.
38 See 15 U.S.C.S. §1 (2004).
39 See Robertson, 399 F. Supp at 882 (stating that it was Congress' intent to encourage collective
bargaining to settle labor disputes); see generally 29 U.S.C.S. §151 (2011).
40 Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
41 See generally Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
42 See Ryan M. Rodenberg, The NBA's Latest Three Point Play: Age Eligibility Rules, Antitrust,
and Labor Law, 25 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 14, 16 (2008) (noting that if and when a prospective NBA
player sues the NBA because of its age eligibility rules, the litigation would likely mirror Maurice
Clarett's lawsuit); see generally Jack N.E. Pitts, Jr., Notes & Comments, Why Wait?: An Antitrust
Analysis of the National Football League and National Basketball Association's Draft Eligibility Rules,
51 How. L.J. 433, 451 (2008).
43 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125; see Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F.Supp.2d 379, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting the undisputed facts of the trial court, stating Clarett was a running back for
2012] 2 1
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successful player prior to entering the draft, obtaining the Big Ten
Freshman of the Year award, and becoming the first college freshman to
start at his position at OSU.44 Before the start of Clarett's second season, he
was suspended for filing a false police report and receiving extra benefits
worth thousands of dollars. 45 Clarett moved his focus from returning to
college football to entering the NFL draft. However, Clarett was ineligible
to do so because of the rules of eligibility.46 Those rules at the time were
collectively bargained between the NFL and its players union.47
The district court held that the labor exemption sometimes allowed as
part of the collective bargaining process should not apply because it fails
the three prongs of a test called the Mackey Test set forth by the Eighth
circuit.48 While the Mackey test is not relevant to what this Note proposes,
the case involved a challenge brought by NFL players against the NFL rule
(the Rozelle Rule) requiring an NFL team who signed a player, to
compensate his former team.49 In Clarett, the NFL argued that the
eligibility rules prevented those players who were not ready for the NFL,
both physically and emotionally, from entering the league.50 Furthermore,
the NFL believed that it would prevent the sport from losing its value
because of an increase in injuries. 51 The district court did not find these
Ohio State University).
44 Clareit, 369 F.3d at 125-126 (noting the accolades Maurice Clarett achieved during his college
football career). See generally Joe Drape, COLLEGE FOOTBALL; Extra! Extra! It's Ohio State, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 04, 2003, at DI available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/04/sports/college-football-
extra-extra-it-s-ohtio-state.htm.
45 Mike Freeman, FOOTBALL; Buckeyes Suspend Clarett For Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at
DI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/11/sports/football-buckeyes-suspend-clarett-for-
year.html?pagewanted=1; see also Clarett caught sleeping during class, ESPN (Nov. 8, 2003),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1657021.
46 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126 (referring to the NFL eligibility rules which state that a player
needed to wait three full seasons after the player's high school graduation); see generally Legal
Challenge? Clarett asks NFL to Change Rules, Allow Him to Enter 2004 Draft, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(SEPT. 14, 2003)
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/football/ncaa/09/14/bc.fbn.clarett.nfl.ap/index.html.
47 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126-27 (stating The NFL's collective bargaining agreement is effective
from 1993-2007); see also Damon Hack, INSIDE THE N.F.L.; Fitzgerald May Contest NFL.
Eligibility Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at DI, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/14/sports/inside-the-nfl-fitzgerald-may-contest-nfl-eligibility-
rule.html?src=pm.
48 See id. at 129; see also Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)
(putting forth a three part test: the restrictions to concern mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,
the restrictions only atTect the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, and the agreement is part
of a bona fide arms-length bargaining process).
49 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133 (explaining the NFL's Rozelle Rule, which the NFL argued was exempt
from antitrust laws because it was included in the collective bargaining agreement).
50 See id. at 129.
51 See id; See Boris v. United States Football League, No. 89-4980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at
*3-4 (Cen. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) (stating the court's reasons for the rule were to help further competitive
balance and maturity, and for players to receive a college education).
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arguments adequate, stating that these issues could be addressed through
"less restrictive but equally effective means." 52
The United States Court of Appeals reversed the district court ruling,
stating that they never believed the Eighth Circuit's test was not
appropriate, and that the CBA itself makes it clear as to how to handle
eligibility rules. 53 Furthermore, the court expressed a concern about the
impact of not having such rules in place would have on the job security of
veteran players. 54 Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the NFL, and
Maurice Clarett was denied the right to enter the NFL draft. 55
This case is similar because it deals with the problem of draft eligibility
rules and a collective bargaining agreement. Many people believe that a
player may eventually win a suit against a major league association because
of the district court ruling in favor of Clarett and because the Second
Circuit is the only circuit to have ruled on this issue. 56 Additionally, some
argue that while Clarett would have had to argue a "hypothetical point" that
he would succeed in the NFL, a potential NBA player would not. This is
because, contrary to an NFL player, an NBA player can point to other
players who made the jump from high school straight to the NBA with
favorable statistics. 57 This kind of data is not available in the NFL, because
there are no players who made this jump. The NBA, on the other hand, has
seven years of experience and data of athletes coming out of high school,
and many of them have succeeded.58 However, the collective bargaining
will be a difficult, if not impossible obstacle to overcome.
F. Reverse Age Discrimination
Since it is so difficult, or nearly impossible to obtain a successful
52 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
53 See id. at 142 ("[T]he collective bargaining agreement itself makes clear that the union and the
NFL reached an agreement with respect to how the eligibility rules would be handled.").
54 See id. at 140 (noting that the veteran player would fall out of favor more quickly if the leagues
allowed for younger, fresher athletes to enter the draft earlier); see also Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v.
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) (finding that the preservation of jobs for union
members is a vital concern).
55 See Clarret, 369 F.3d at 143 ("We, however, follow the Supreme Court's lead in declining to
'fashion antitrust exemption so as to give additional advantage to professional football players . . . that
transport workers, coal miners, or meat packers would not enjoy."') (quoting Brown v. Pro Football 518
U.S. 231, 249 (1996)).
56 See Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Law, Tech. and the Arts Symposium -- Who is
Eligible to Play?: Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. 731, 757
(2006); see also Michael McCann, Legal Issues of NBA Draft Age Floor, THE SPORTS L. BLOG (July 1,
2005, 10:47 AM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2005/07/legal-issues-of-nba-draft-age-floor.htrnl
[hereinafter Sports Law Blog].
57 See McCann, supra note 56; see also Sports Law Blog, supra note 56.
58 See McCann, supra note 56; see also Sports Law Blog, supra note 56.
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judgment in an antitrust action because of the labor exemption of CBAs,
potential NBA athletes must make other claims. The first possibility for
these individuals is that of reverse age discrimination. The second could be
an equal protection claim.
Reverse age discrimination is a claim that is rarely made, however both
the Seventh and Ninth circuits, both dealing with retirement plans, have
heard cases dealing with such a claim. In 1975 Congress passed the Age
Discrimination Act (ADA), which prohibits age discrimination in federal
programs. 59 It was suggested in this Act that the young are often
discriminated against and therefore deserve protection as well. 60 However,
this logic did not follow when Congress passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. 61 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's general
provisions state that it is unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge an individual or otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age." 62 While this may seem
to protect individuals of any age, ADEA Section 621 states that the purpose
of this Act is to "promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age, to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; and to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 63 More
specifically, the ADEA was intended to protect individuals between the
ages of 40 and 65, and to prevent having their careers unreasonably taken
away from them. 64 Ultimately, confusion existed as to which individuals
the ADEA actually protected, ending with a Supreme Court decision with
unfavorable results for potential NBA stars. 65
In Hamilton v. Caterpillar, the Seventh Circuit held that legislative
history provides no evidence of intent to protect against age discrimination
59 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2010); see Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Can Discrimination Affect the Imposition of
a Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the Nat'l Basketball Ass'n?, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 585, 599 (2001) (noting that at the time Congress believed the young warranted protection).
60 See 121 CONG. REC. 9212 (1975) (statement of Rep. John Brademas) ("Its provisions are broad
and it is the intent of the committee that it apply to age discrimination at all age levels, from the
youngest to the oldest."); Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 599.
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2010); Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 599 (noting that Section 631 of the
ADEA states it only provides protection for those of at least forty years old).
62 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(1) (2010).
63 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2010).
6 See Brennan v. Paragon Emp't Agency, 356 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also 29
U.S.C. § 631 (2011).
65 See Ennis, supra note 16, at 753-755; see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581, 584 (2004).
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against the young. 66 Furthermore, the court noted that this circuit had
explained in a prior decision that the ADEA "does not protect the young as
well as the old, or even, we think, the younger against the older."67 There, a
corporation, Caterpillar Incorporated, announced the closing of two
separate plants, and implemented early retirement plans for its employees
who were fifty years old, and had ten years of service. 68 Plaintiff Michael
Hamilton brought a class action suit against Caterpillar, alleging that
Caterpillar had violated the ADEA. Hamilton sued Caterpillar, both for
himself, and on behalf of other persons similarly situated, because they
were too young to qualify for early retirement benefits. 69 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit has made it clear that the ADEA does not provide a remedy
for reverse age discrimination. 70 In Stone v. Travelers, the Ninth Circuit,
however, while not resolving the issue of reverse age discrimination
directly, "expressed incredulity at the idea that the petitioner could recover
for being discriminated against because he was too young." 71 There, John
Stone filed a complaint against his employer, Travelers Corporation,
alleging that the distribution of the severance payments violated the
ADEA.72 As a result of the split between the circuits, a claim for reverse
age discrimination seems hopeful for young talented NBA players.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics v. Cline
could hurt the chances of a successful reverse age discrimination claim.73
G. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of the law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."74
66 See Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992).
67 Id. at 1227 (citing Karlen v. City Coils. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988), superseded
by O'Brien v. Bd. Of Educ., 92 F. Supp 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
68 Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1226-27.
69 See id. at 1227.
70 See id. at 1228.
71 Ennis, supra note 16, at 757 (citing Stone v. Travelers Corp. 58 F.3d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1995)
(involving a claim that Travelers' manner of providing for Stone's early retirement violated ADEA).
72 Stone, 58 F.3d at 436.
73 See discussion infra Part II.
74 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Throughout litigation of Equal Protection claims, the Supreme Court has
established three levels of judicial scrutiny; in other words the Court
established what standard each side needs to prove in order to assert a
successful Equal Protection claim.
The first level is minimum scrutiny, otherwise known as the rational
basis standard.Minimum scrutiny requires a classification in a statute to be
rationally related to a legitimate government objective, resulting in great
deference to the state under this level of scrutiny. 75 A plaintiff challenging
a classification must prove that the classification does not rationally
advance a legitimate state objective, or that the state objective is not
legitimate.
The highest level of scrutiny is known as strict scrutiny. This level
renders a classification presumptively void because of the classification is
one of a suspect criteria, such as race, or because it substantially impinges
on a fundamental right. In this instance, the burden is on the government to
prove that the classification is narrowly tailored to accomplish a
compelling state interest. 76 If the classification impinges on fundamental
rights, a suspect class is not necessary. Certain rights that the Supreme
Court found to be fundamental throughout years of litigation are interstate
migration 77 and denying or diluting the right to vote.78
The last level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny established in Craig v.
Boren,79 after both strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny were introduced. In
Craig v. Boren, Oklahoma passed a law forbidding the sale of beer to males
under twenty-one years old, and females who were under eighteen years
old.80 The Court held that the law did not satisfy Oklahoma's goal of
improving the state's public health and safety, and while not applying strict
scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny, the Court adopted a "new, middle level
of scrutiny." 81 This level of scrutiny requires the government to prove that
75 See generally Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (holding that a NY
statute prohibiting owners from pumping water, gas and oil on his own land is not a violation of Equal
Protection because of the rational relation between the law and the goals of protecting mineral springs
and preventing waste); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. V. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
76 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
77 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1999) (holding that the proper standard for the right to
travel is strict scrutiny); see also Southold v. Cross Sound Ferry Servs., 477 F.3d 38, 53 (2d Cir. 2007).
78 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (finding that durational residency
requirements deprive citizens of the fundamental right to vote); see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that the requirement of a fee to condition a ballot violates
the Equal Protection Clause because it results in invidious discrimination).
79 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
80 Id. at 197.
81 See id. at 200; see also Julie R. Steiner, Age Classifications and the Fourteenth Amendment: Is
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the statute's classifications are substantially related to an important
government interest.82 Due to the fact that this test required less than a
compelling state interest, but more than a legitimate state interest, the test is
intermediate in nature. 83 The intermediate standard was established after
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,84 which held that the
standard used for age discrimination is the rational basis standard, or
minimum scrutiny.85
II. POLICY CONCERNS OF THE AGE LIMIT
The current CBA of the NBA requires an individual to be at least
nineteen years old in order to be eligible for the NBA draft. In fact, the
current Commissioner of the NBA, David Stern, plans to attempt to raise
the age eligibility rules from nineteen years of age to twenty, or until the
player is two years out of high school. 86 His rationale is that the NFL's
eligibility requirement is three years after high school, so the NBA should
follow suit.87 There are many reasons why the NFL and the NBA cannot be
compared, and rather should be distinguished with regard to the age limit.
A. The Rise ofDissatisfaction
The current age limit, joined with the potential increase of the age limit,
has caused an uproar from a Congressman, current and former NBA
players, and many interested fans. Education Secretary, Arne Duncan,
explained that there is no reason to prevent these players from entering the
the Murgia Standard too Old to Stand?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 263, 273 (1995) (discussing the
facts of Craig v. Boren).
82 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (stating that gender based classifications must serve
important governmental objectives, and must be substantially related to achieve those objectives); see
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996) (holding that gender based classifications, based
on generalizations and stereotypes about the differing abilities and interests of the different genders,
violate the Equal Protection Clause under intermediate scrutiny).
83 See Craig, 492 U.S. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny); see Steiner, supra note 81 (discussing that the test applied in Craig v.
Boren was a new middle level of scrutiny that was intermediate in nature).
84 Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
85 See discussion infra Part III.
86 See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Commissioner Stern Wants to Preserve Age Limit for Players, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2009, at B 15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/sports/basketball/05stem.html; see also Stern Wants NBA Age
Limit Raised to 20, ESPN (Apr. 13, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2035132.
87 See Stern Wants NBA Age Limit Raised to 20, supra note 86 (quoting David Stem as saying,
"I'm optimistic the union will agree to some raise in the minimum age in the current collective
bargaining."); see also Steve E. Cavezza, Can I See Some ID?: An Antitrust Analysis of NBA and NFL
Draft Eligibility Rules, 9 U. DENv. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 22 (2010) (stating that the NFL requires players
to be three years out of high school before joining the league).
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NBA when eighteen year olds can enlist to be sent to Afghanistan.88
Furthermore, he believes that players who are forced to go to school for
one year will barely take enough credits, and cruise through the year not
learning anything.89 This completely defeats the purpose of the "one and
done" rule. LeBron James was quoted as saying "what's the point if you
don't want to be in school?" 90 If the purpose of this rule is to force an
education on these athletes, and to mature them, this simply is not
succeeding.
Additionally, Spencer Haywood, a former NBA star who is known for
paving the way for future stars such as LeBron James, spoke out against
this rule as well: "How can the players association do that? They represent
veterans who pay dues. They don't represent kids trying to get in early." 91
Tennessee Congressman Steve Cohen went as far as calling this rule "a
vestige of slavery," although he slightly retracted his statement by saying it
was not the same type of slavery as 150 years ago. 92
NBA forward Jermaine O'Neal believes that the NBA's age eligibility
rule arose through racism. 93 He explains that in the last couple of years the
winners of the Rookie of the Year awards were players straight out of high
school.94 O'Neal expressed concerned that "[a]s a black guy, you kind of
think that's the reason why it's coming up. You don't hear about it in
baseball or hockey." 95 While this Note will not go as far as proposing the
NBA's rule to be a product of racism, it will compare the rule with that of
88 George Vecsey, Arne Duncan Challenges the NCA.A., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/sports/ncaabasketbal/15vecsey.html; see Am Tellem, Arn on
Arne, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2010, 12:48 PM), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/am-
tellem/arn-on-ame b 433138.html (discussing that the NBA should change the minimum age back to
eighteen because eighteen is the age at which men can get married, vote, and fight in foreign wars).
89 See Katie Thomas, Education Chief Criticizes N.B.A. and the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2010) (noting that some players are simply passed through their institutions); see Vecsey, supra note 88
(pointing out that players take as few as six credits a semester).
90 Vecsey, supra note 88; see Tellem, supra note 88 (quoting LeBron James discussing the "one-
and-done" rule).
91 Brady, supra note 35.
92 Pete Thamel, Congressman Asks N.B.A. and Union to Rescind Age Minimum for Players, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2009), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/sports/basketball/04webcohen.html.
93 See Pacer's O'Neal Says NBA draft age limit smacks of racism, NBC SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2005),
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/7469844/ [hereinafter NBCSports.com]; see also Stern wants NBA age
limit raised to 20, ESPN (Apr. 13, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2035132.
94 See NBCSports.com, supra note 93 (noting that the last two high school players who have wont
the rookie of the year awards are LeBron James, and Amare Stoudemire); see also Encyclopedia of
World Biography, LeBron James Biography, NOTABLEBIOGRAPHIES.COM,
http://www.notablebiographies.com/news/Ge-La/James-LeBron.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011 9:00
PM); see also Amar e Stoudemire Early Life and Career, http://amarestoudemire.com/bio/early-life-
and-career/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2011 9:04 PM).
95 NBCSports.com, supra note 93.
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other sports, and show that the rule seems quite arbitrary.
B. NBA v. Other Major Sporting Industries
Vast differences exist between the NBA's draft eligibility rules and those
of other sports. Other leagues, in which a higher risk of danger exists, such
as the National Hockey League (NHL) and National Association for Stock
Car Auto Racing (NASCAR), provide no age limits as to those who are
eligible to play. The NHL's eligibility rules state that all players age
eighteen or older are eligible for claim in the entry draft.96 John Tavares,
for example, an NHL player, was drafted at the age of fourteen by the
Ontario Hockey League (OHL) because he was considered an "exceptional
player." 97 Major League Baseball (MLB) allows players to be drafted if
they have graduated from high school and have not yet attended college or
junior college. Also eligible are college players who have completed their
junior or senior years or are at least 21, and junior college players,
regardless of how many years were completed. 98 In other words, MLB
virtually has no age limit, similar to the rules of NASCAR, Boxing,
Tennis,99 and Golf.00
Although the idea that the NBA rule is a product of racism may seem
farfetched, Jermaine O'Neal has a valid point. What about the other
sports? In baseball, a player can risk a 99 mile per hour fastball hitting his
head at any age after high school, but he cannot play in the NBA.l0 In
96 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Nat'l Hockey League Management and Nat'1 Hockey
League Players' Assoc. Art. VHII § 4(a) (2005), http://www.nhlpa.comI/docs/about-
us/nhl nhlpa_2005_cba.pdf.
97 See Adam Epstein Esq., Age and Sports Law, WISBAR (May 3, 2006),
http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:xSe8P3RGLwMJ:www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm%3FSection
%3DSports andEntertainmentLawSection%26Template%3D/CM/ContentDisplay.cfn%26Contentl
D%3D57388+age+and+sports+law&cd=l&hl=en&ct-clnk&gl-us&client-firefox-a; see also Lee
Forman, Islanders 101- John Tavares, N.Y. ISLANDERS EXAMINER (Aug. 16, 2009),
http://www.examiner.com/new-york-islanders-in-long-island/islanders- 101 -john-tavares.
98 See Major League Baseball Official Rules, MLB.coM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/drafiday/rules.jspl (last visited Jan. 22, 2012); see also Jeff Aberle, MLB
Transactions Part Six: The Rule 4 Draft, PURPLE Row.COM (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://www.purplerow.com/2009/3/12/788765/mlb-transactions-part-six.
99 See Epstein, supra note 97 (noting that in Tennis an individual can compete in 15 events
between the ages of 17 and 18); see also Nascar Lowers an Age Limit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 12,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/sports/autoracing/13sportsbriefs-
Age.html? r-2.
100 See Epstein, supra note 97 (discussing that golf allows individuals to play at the age of 18, but
those between the ages of 15 and 18 can petition for an exemption); see also Jeff Shain, Lexi Thompson
gets OK to seek LPGA card, SUN-SENTINEL, July 5, 2011, available at http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/2011-07-05/sports/os-lexi-thompson-q-school-0706-201107051 lpga-card-mike-whan-
Ipga-membership (reporting on the age exemption granted to Lexi Thompson, allowing her to play
professionally at age 16).
101 See David Nethers, Ray Chapman and the Anniversary of a Death That Changed Baseball
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hockey, a player runs the risk of being hit with a hockey stick or hockey
puck, or being cut by a skate, yet any player out of high school is eligible to
play.102 In NASCAR an athlete can drive around in circles at
extraordinarily fast speeds, where crashes are what fans sometimes look
forward to most, yet you still cannot play in the NBA. An individual is
mature enough to physically hit someone in the head in boxing, and be hit,
but not to dunk a basketball and cash a check at the same time. 103
The NFL includes a high level of risk, and an age eligibility rule, but is
incomparable to the NBA. In contrast to these other sports, the NFL
requires three seasons of the NFL to be played after high school graduation
before being able to enter the draft.104 The NFL, in Clarett, set forth
arguments that some players would not be mature enough, nor be
physically able and ready to play in the NFL. The NFL also expressed
concern of a decrease in value of the game. The NFL is not the same as the
NBA. The point of the game in the NBA is not to knock the other player
off his feet. Regarding maturity, it is only necessary to look at players such
as Ron Artest and Latrell Sprewell. Ron Artest played two years of college
and started the biggest brawl in the history of the NBA.05 Latrell
Spreewell played college basketball for four years and was suspended for
choking his coach. Some may argue that there will always be thugs in any
sport.106 While that may be true, how can the NBA argue that the maturity
of older players is a reason for its rules? The NFL and the NBA are
Forever, BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 15, 2008), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/48003-ray-chapman-
and-the-anniversary-of-a-death-that-changed-baseball-forever (discussing the death of Ray Chapman a
day after being hit in the head with a baseball); see also Frederick 0. Mueller, Catastrophic Head
Injuries in High School and Collegiate Sports, 36 J. OF ATHLETIC TRAINING 312, 314 (2001).
102 See McCleary announces retirement, CBC SPORTS (Nov. 10, 2000),
http://www.cbc.calsports/story/2000/09/20/trent000920.htmi (referring to Trent McCleary's early
retirement due to being hit in the throat with a slap-shot, requiring an emergency tracheotomy); see also
Hockey Operation Guidelines, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com/nhlhq/hockey ops.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2012).
103 See McCann & Rosen, supra note 58, at 748; see also Rules of World Boxing Assoc. Section
(G) (11).
104 See Collective Bargaining Agreement between Nat'l Football League Management and Nat'l
Football League Players' Assoc. Art. XVI, Section(2)(b) (2006),
static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image../nfl-cba-2006-2012.pdf; see also Clarett v. Nat'l Football
League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
105 See McCann & Rosen, supra note 58, at 761; see also Roy Pickering, Ron Artest Starts Brawl,
David Stern Finishes It, SUITE 101 (Nov. 22, 2004),
http://www.suitel01.com/article.cfin/sportsissues/I 12305 (discussing how Artest leaped over the
scorer's table to attack a fan during a game between the Indiana Pacers and the Detroit Pistons).
106 See Pickering, supra note 105; see also Mike Puma, The Choke Artist: Signature Event, ESPN
CLASSIC (Dec. 10, 2004), http://espn.go.com/classic/s/add-sprewelllatrell.html (explaining the events
that lead up to Spreewell's act of choking his coach, P.J Carlesimo); see also Michael A. Messner,
When Bodies are Weapons: Masculinity and Violence in Sport, in, OUT OF PLAY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON
GENDER AND SPORT, 95-97 (2007).
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different sports, and just because one sport has an age eligibility
requirement, does not mean that the other should too.
The NBA is taking a paternalistic role by trying to presume that it knows
what is best or proper for a young man. 107 The NBA is trying to assert
these arbitrary rules by saying that success in life must run through
college.108 Whether society likes it or not, college is only an option in
America and it is wrong to demand that professional caliber athletes do
what society says they should do.109 The NBA prefers this method because
there will be no cost to the league, giving the players no option but to
develop their skills elsewhere.110 The truth of the matter is that some
players who went to college for a year, such as Derrick Rose, who went to
Memphis, and O.J. Mayo, who went to U.S.C., never belonged in
college."'1 They were always good enough to be in the NBA straight out of
high school, and they were only students because they were forced.1 2 At
first, many believed that this rule would turn NBA players on to receiving
an education. While David Stem admitted it was a business decision, it
seemed like "genuine altruism on his part when he said that it was time to
get NBA scouts and general managers out of high school gyms." 13 The
truth is that Stem raised the age because owners and general managers
107 See Spencer Morris, Why the NBA's Rule is a Disgrace, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/153153-the-nbas-eligibility-rule-is-a-disgrace; see also Susan
McAleavey, Spendthrift Trust: An Alternative to the NBA Age Rule, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 279, 280
(2010).
108 See Morris, supra note 107 ("Have we determined that the only path for 'success' in life must
run through college?"); see also McAleavey, supra note 107, at 284.
109 See Morris, supra note 107; see also McAleavey, supra note 107, at 286-87.
110 See Fuhrman, supra 59, at 588 (explaining why the NBA prefers the age eligibility rules); see
also, Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of the Legality of Preventing High
School Athletes and College Underclassmen from Entering Professional Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL
J. SPORTS L. 539, 570 (1998) (discussing the justification that maintaining intercollegiate athletics as a
developmental system will save the league money).
III See Michael Del Muro, USC Basketball is Dead, but NBA Rules Share the Blame, BLEACHER
REPORT (June 11, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/196977-usc-basketball-is-dead-but-nba-
rules-are-to-blame (noting that the NBA draft eligibility rules have created a system that taints college
basketball and future stars. This is because none of these college athletes would have received gifts and
money in order to either stay in college or to construct an agreement of future representation in the
NBA, if they were allowed to go to the NBA straight from high school); see also Michael A. McCann,
Illegal Defense: The Law and Economics of Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, I VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 314-21 (2002).
112 See Muro, supra note Ill (noting the 'one and done' rule requires the athletes to go to school
for one year, when they never wanted to be there in the first place); see also McCann, supra note I 11, at
326-28.
113 Buzz Bissinger, Bring Back Basketball's Little Big Men, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, at A31,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/opinion/27bissinger.html; see Benjamin S.
Weisfelner, Reverse Slam Dunk: Making the Case That the National Basketball Association 's Minimum
Age Requirement Violates State Discrimination Laws, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 203, 211-
12 (2011).
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resented the amount of time it took to train players out of high school.114
The NBA decided to deal with this issue by acting as decision makers for
the potential NBA stars, and sending a message to them that school should
come first. This paternalistic role that the NBA is taking on is not what the
business of the NBA entails.
While both disaster and success stories of those who have made the jump
straight from high school have occurred,1 15 the Commissioner, requiring an
athlete to be nineteen to enter the draft is arbitrarily denying the rights of
these athletes to work because of their age. A path for these players must
be available in order to rectify the problem that the NBA has caused.
Therefore, it is time for the players to start looking at other opportunities
and making new arguments, to allow their voices to be heard, and asserting
their rights through different applicable laws.
III. THE NEW ROUTE FOR INELIGIBLE ATHLETES
A. The ADEA Should Allow For Reverse Age Discrimination Claims
Potential NBA players received a crushing blow when the Supreme
Court made its ruling on reverse age discrimination claims in 1997. The
Court held that the ADEA does not cover reverse age discrimination
claims. 116 In General Dynamics v. Cline, the petitioner had a collective
bargaining agreement with the United Auto Workers. This agreement
eliminated an obligation to provide health benefits to subsequently retired
employees, except as to the current workers, who were at least 50 years
old.117 Cline and the respondents, who were then between the ages of 40
and 50, were protected by the act, but missed out on the health benefits.118
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) agreed with
Cline that the agreement violated the ADEA, and invited General
114 See Bissinger, supra note 113 (noting that Stem did this to appease the owners of NBA teams,
who wanted to avoid the possibility of players in their early twenties being free agents, able to choose
the team they want to play for); see also Weisfelner, supra note 113, at 210.
115 See NBA Age Limit Pros and Cons, 21ST CENTURY PALADIN (Apr. 18, 2005),
http://www.2lstcenturypaladin.com/2005/04/18/nba-age-limit-pros-and-cons/ (highlighting the
successful players who made the jump straight from high school such as LeBron James, who averaged
20.9 points per game at the age of 18, and the unsuccessful, such as Jonathon Bender, averaging 2.7
points per game at the age of 18); see also McCann, supra note 111, at 314-21.
116 See General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) ("We see the text,
structure, purpose, and history of the ADEA, along with its relationship to other federal statutes, as
showing that the statute does not mean to stop an employer from favoring an older employee over a
younger one.").
117 Id. at 584 (discussing the elements of the collective bargaining agreement).
118 Id
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Dynamics to settle with Cline.1 19 The attempt to settle had failed, and Cline
brought action in the district court, which held that no court ever granted
relief for reverse age discrimination under the ADEA.120 The Sixth Circuit,
however, reversed the district court's holding, reasoning that "the
prohibition of 623(a)(1) covering discrimination against any individual ...
because of such individual's age,' is so clear on its face" that if Congress
intended to protect only the older worker, it would have said SO.121
Unfortunately for the potential NBA players, the trial did not end here.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision for two main
reasons: legislative history and the plain meaning of age.122 The majority
opinion pointed to the legislative history behind the ADEA, noting that the
law does not provide for reverse age discrimination.123 It stated that not
only was age left out with regards to the different types of discrimination
forbidden by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,124 but in Congress'
proposal for the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, the testimony
at both hearings concentrated on assumptions about the effect of age on
ability to work.125 Thus, the Court stated that all findings and statements
produced proof that age discrimination intensified over time, or are
"couched in terms that refer to 'older' workers, explicitly or implicitly
relative to 'younger' ones." 126
Secondly, the Court focused on the plain meaning of age. They
determined that it is a commonplace conception of American society that
its character is "youth culture" and a world where better means younger,
and that discrimination because of age is commonly understood as against
older individuals.127 Furthermore, Cline argued that the meaning of age
was uniform throughout the statute, and that specific provisions could not
mean to only protect older individuals.128 However, the Court counters this
119 See id at 585.
120 See id. (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v. Cline, 98 F. Supp. 2d 846, 848 (N.D.Ohio
2000)).
121 Id.
122 See Ennis, supra note 16, at 759-63 (comparing the arguments of both the majority and
dissenting opinion).
123 See id. at 759 (citing Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 585).
124 See id.
125 See Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 588; see Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearing on H.R.
3651, H.R. 3768, HR. 4221 Before the Subcomm. on Labor, 90' Cong. 151 (1967) (statement of Rep.
Joshua Eilberg) ("[A]t age 40, a worker may find that age restrictions become common . .. by age 45
his employment opportunities are likely to contract sharply, and shrink more severely at age 55 and
vanish by age 65 . . . ").
126 Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 590.
127 See id. at 591.
128 See Ennis, supra note 16, at 760 (citing Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 594) (referring to the Age
Discrimination Employment Act).
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argument by stating that this is an incorrect presumption.129 Additionally,
the Court added that this presumption will be overcome when there is a
variation in the connection in which the words are used as "reasonably to
warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act
with different intent."130
However, this Supreme Court ruling should not apply to claims of
reverse age discrimination with regards to the NBA eligibility rule. There
is a vast difference between receiving benefits and attempting to obtain
gainful employment. These cases often deal with retirement or health
benefits, resulting in employees who already have jobs and are being
denied extra money, or health insurance. The potential NBA players, the
young athletes who are playing hard and training every day, are being
denied the right to work at all based on their age.
Moreover, the Supreme Court ruling in General Dynamics should be
overruled for three reasons; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for reverse
discrimination suits, the language of the ADEA, and the legislative history
of the statue. First, since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for reverse
discrimination suits based upon race and sex, reverse age discrimination
claims should be allowed as well.131 Opponents may argue that the intent
of Congress when passing the ADEA was to protect the older employees,
and not the young. However, two cases preclude such an argument. The
first case is Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, where the court found
that males were protected under Title VII from sexual harassment.132 The
second case is McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., where it
was held that Title VII protected whites discriminated against in favor of
racial minorities.133 Undoubtedly, Congress was not concerned with male
sexual harassment, nor discrimination against whites when it passed these
acts, however, both cases show that reverse discrimination still violates an
individuals' civil rights. Opponents will argue that age is not an immutable
characteristic, and therefore does not require the same protection. On the
contrary, opponents may argue that allowing for reverse age discrimination
will be a slippery slope, eventually leading to younger individuals having a
129 See Gen. Dynamics 540 U.S. at 595 (2004) (citing Atl. Cleaners & Dyers Inc. v. U.S., 286 U.S.
427, 433 (1932)).
130 Id.; see U.S. v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 216 (2001); see also Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co. 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
131 See Ennis, supra note 16, at 763; see also Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 597-98.
132 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
133 See McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976) (noting that Title VII
prohibited all racial discrimination in employment, without exception for any group of particular
employees).
434
THE NBA & AGE ELIGIBILITY
history of unequal treatment. While it is true that older individuals will
have a harder time obtaining a new job when they are fired, as opposed to
younger individuals, that does not mean that younger applicants should be
denied all of the protection of age discrimination laws.
Second, as Scalia explained, the EEOC's interpretation that the
agreement violated the ADEA was "neither foreclosed by the statute
[ADEA] nor unreasonable" and that the Court should defer to EEOC,
which is charged with administering the statute, and allow for reverse age
discrimination. 134 Third, the plain meaning and language of the ADEA
calls for the admissibility of suits brought by the young.135 The Court
explains that "the starting point for the interpretation of a statute is always
its language."l 36 The ADEA clearly states that one must not discriminate
against another on the basis of the individual's age.137 This phrase does not
restrict discrimination to only those of an older age.138 As Justice Thomas
stated in his dissent:
"If an employer fired a worker for the sole reason that the worker was
under 45, it would be entirely natural to say that the worker had been
discriminated against because of his age. I struggle to think of what
other phrase I would use to describe such behavior. I wonder how the
Court would describe such incidents, because the Court apparently
considers such usage to be unusual, atypical, or aberrant." 39
Lastly, legislative history proves that the ADEA should bar
discrimination of the young. A statement made by Senator Yarborough, a
sponsor of the bill, when discussing this particular issue in question,
confirmed that "the text really meant what is said."' 40 This is further proof
that the primary meaning of "age" as used in the ADEA is an "individual's
chronological age." 141 While age may have alternative meanings, such as
"the state of being old" or "hair white with age," Congress clearly intended
134 Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 See id. at 603 (Thomas J., dissenting); but see id at 598 (majority opinion) (interpreting the
plain language in the opposite way).
136 Id. at 602 (Thomas J., dissenting) (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 490 U.S.
730, 739 (1989)).
137 See id. at 603; see 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(1) (2011).
138 See Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the plain language of
the ADEA clearly allows for suits brought by the young when discriminated against in favor of the old);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
139 Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 606 (explaining that, although the statute is clear and legislative history is unnecessary,
the history confirms that the plain reading of the text is the correct reading); see 113 CONG. REC. 31,
255 (1967).
141 Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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to use the primary meaning of the word, given the context of the statute. 142
The statute would be incoherent if the alternate meaning of age was
intended for two reasons. 143 First, Section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA provides
a defense where "age is a bona fide occupational qualification" and if "age"
was meant to be limited to older age, then this defense would "provide a
defense only where a defense is not needed, since under the Court's
reading, discrimination against the relatively young is always legal under
the ADEA."144 Second, Section 623(e) of the ADEA bans printing of any
notice or advertisement indicating a preference, or discrimination based on
age.145 If "age" was intended to mean "old age" then an employer would be
able to advertise asking only for young applicants, and could not advertise
for older applicants, even though the ADEA bans this kind of
discrimination.146 If anything, it is not unclear as to whether Congress
intended to include the young, or whether they intended to favor the old.147
It seems that the Supreme Court has settled on the determination that the
ADEA is meant to protect older employees, even though the statute says
that one cannot be discriminated against because of such individual's age
without specifying the required age to make a claim.
Reverse discrimination claims are not impossible, regardless of the
holding in General Dynamics.14 8 Section 1625 of the ADEA makes it clear
that "the ADEA does not preempt State age discrimination in employment
laws." 49 Therefore, it is possible to make a state law claim for age
discrimination. Two influential states have determined that reverse age
142 Id at 603; see 113 CONG. REc. 31, 255 (1967) (stating, in Congressional debate before passing
the ADEA, that the law was intended to prevent both age discrimination and reverse age
discrimination).
143 Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (providing
a defense for "age" as a bona fide occupational defense, where "age" is not qualified as "older age").
144 Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 604 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145 29 U.S.C. § 623(e).
146 See Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(e)
(prohibiting advertisements expressing preference for age, and failing to limit "age" to "older age").
147 See Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to the fact that the
majority believes it is clear that Congress intended to protect the elderly, as opposed to the young); see
also 113 CONG. REC. 31255 (1967) (stating, in the only legislative history on point, that the ADEA was
intended to protect both young and older employees from age discrimination, contrary to the majority in
General Dynamics).
148 See Ennis, supra note 16, at 768 (discussing the possibility of state law claims); see e.g.,
Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 957 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a reverse age
discrimination claim could be brought under New Jersey's state law).
149 29 C.F.R. § 162 5 .10(g) (2011); see Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631-32 (Iowa 1989)
(stating that the Iowa statute makes it unfair to discriminate because of age, and, since the action is
brought under the state statute, that is the statute the court applies); see also Fisher v. Quaker Oats Co.,
559 A.2d 1, 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (explaining that the ADEA does not preempt state age
discrimination laws).
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discrimination can be present under state law: New Jersey and
California.150
First, in the California case, Lazar v. Hertz, the plaintiff brought a class
action suit alleging age discrimination for himself and on behalf of others
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five.151 The plaintiffs believed that
a rental car company's refusal to rent automobiles to persons under the age
of 25 resulted in an unreasonable restriction. 152 While the court did not
allow for a reverse age discrimination claim, it demonstrated that this area
of law could be susceptible to a reverse age discrimination claim had the
court not been required to defer to a vehicle regulation. 153
Secondly, in Bergen v. Sisler, plaintiff Michael Sisler lost his job without
an opportunity to prove to his employer that he was capable of the job, and
was replaced by an older employee.154 The applicable statute in New Jersey
was the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, (LAD) which provided
that "all persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment ...
without discrimination because of age." 155 New Jersey followed an Oregon
court decision holding that when there is a qualified applicant for a
position, and he or she is not hired without any legitimate reason, along
with age being a per se fact, then it would be an unlawful employment
practice.156 The New Jersey court constructed its own standard, and found
that the LAD encompassed Sisler's claim. The New Jersey standard
requires the employee to show that age "played a role in the decision
making process and that it had a determinative influence on the outcome of
that process." 57
The court further distinguished between direct evidence of age
discrimination and circumstantial evidence of age discrimination. When
there is direct evidence of age discrimination, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that it would have made the same decision regardless of
150 See Bergen Commercial Bank, 723 A.2d at 957; see also Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368, 377-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1999); Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 605.
151 Lazar, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371.
152 Id.
153 See id at 377-38 (denying an age discrimination claim for other reasons, implicitly leaving
open the possibility of a reverse age discrimination claim); see also Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 605.
154 Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 196-67 (1999) (discussing the facts of the
case).
155 Id. at 199.
156 See id at 204; see also Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 299 Or. 98, 100 (explaining the statute that
New Jersey based their opinion off of); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030(1)(a) (2009) (noting that it is an
unlawful employment practice to refuse to hire someone based on age if the individual is 18 years or
older).
157 Bergen, 157 N.J. at 207 (citing Malorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J. Super. 323, 344
(App. Div. 1997)).
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the impermissible consideration. 5 8 If there is circumstantial evidence,
which is more likely to be the case, a three-step process is commenced.
The first step in the process requires the plaintiff to prove four separate
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.159 First, that the plaintiff
belongs to a protected class; second, that the plaintiff applied and was
qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants;
third, that the plaintiff was rejected despite having adequate qualifications;
and lastly, that the employer continued to seek applications for that job.160
Next, the employer must show that he/she had legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for rejecting the employee.161 If this evidence is
shown, then the presumption of discrimination will disappear.162 The third
and final part of the process requires the employee to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason given by the
defendant was not true, and was "merely a pretext for discrimination." 63
In the end, the fact that one influential state accepted a claim for reverse
age discrimination, and another did not dismiss it, indicates the potential
for state reverse age discrimination claims for NBA athletes.164
Additionally, age discrimination law is extremely vulnerable to changes in
the economy, especially under state law.165 A standard like the one set
forth in Bergen should be a standard that the Federal courts should consider
when dealing with the age requirement of the NBA. Due to the fact that
158 Bergen, 157 N.J. at 209; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1989)
(explaining the shifting of burdens on proving that age is a substantial factor in an employment
decision).
159 See Bergen, 157 N.J. at 209-10 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas standard, which is the test
used to determine discrimination through circumstantial evidence, since direct evidence is hard to come
by); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
160 See Bergen, 157 N.J. at 210 (quoting Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 550
(1990)); see also Andersen v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 492 (1982) (stating the elements that must be
satisfied for aprima facie case of unlawful discrimination).
161 See Bergen, 157 N.J. at 210; see also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981) (noting that the plaintiff's burden is not onerous).
162 See Bergen, 157 N.J. at 211; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (stating that the defendant's
showing of legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection rebuts the presumption that
the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee).
163 See Bergen, 157 N.J. at 211; see also Murray v. Newark Hous. Auth., 311 N.J. Super. 163, 173
(1998) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
164 See Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 605-06 (explaining what the two states, California and New
Jersey, did in terms of recognizing reverse age discrimination); see also Megan Jordan Strickland, Note,
The Impact of Interpretation: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act as Determined by the Sixth
Circuit, 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 197, 208 (2003) (noting that plaintiffs have succeeded in arguing a
reverse age discrimination claim in some states).
165 See Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 606 (discussing why younger individuals should maintain hope
for protection from age discrimination); see also Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 69 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1502
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1999) (discussing that business retain the right, under state law, to adopt reasonable
regulations for their services).
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direct evidence of age discrimination will be rare, the test for circumstantial
evidence will allow for protection of both those teenage athletes who in
fact are being discriminated against, and for teams and owners, who
genuinely decided in a non-discriminatory fashion to proceed in another
direction, with another player. Therefore, the NBA player should have a
much better chance of success if they allege a state law violation of age
discrimination.
B. The Age Eligibility Rule is a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Denying high school players the right to obtain gainful employment
based on their age is unconstitutional and violates the players' equal
protection of the laws. Thus, another legal avenue for potential NBA
players would be a constitutional claim under the 14thAmendment of the
Constitution.166 "It requires no argument to show that the right to work for
a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of
the Amendment to secure."167
There is a difference between the test required to prove age
discrimination under the ADEA and that of age discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause. On one hand, the ADEA requires the employer to
show that the job classifications that are based on age are necessary for
business and that a basis exists to make an employer believe that all those
protected by the ADEA would not be able to do the job, or that the
protected class' ability to do the job is impossible.168 The test for Equal
Protection, on the other hand, requires the challenger to show that there is
no reasonable basis for the classification.169
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts Board v. Murgia is responsible for
the formation of this test. 170 In Murgia, a police officer was forced to retire
on his 50th birthday, resulting in a civil action alleging that he was denied
166 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating that no state shall deprive anyone of life, liberty or
property, without due process, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law).
167 Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
168 See Ennis, supra note 16, at 754-755 (explaining the test for proving discrimination under the
ADEA); see also Julie R. Steiner, Age Classifications and the Fourteenth Amendment: Is the Murgia
Standard Too Old to Stand?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 263, 289-90 (highlighting the differences
between the test for proving discrimination under the ADEA and Equal Protection in the 14th
amendment).
169 See Steiner, supra note 169, at 290; see also Klotsche v. N.Y., 621 F.Supp. 1113, 1117
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
170 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that the
standard for age discrimination is the rational basis standard).
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equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.171 The Court
determined that old age does not fall under the "discrete and insular" group
requiring extra protection.172 Having made this determination, the resulting
test for age discrimination was the rational basis standard. 173 This standard
requires that the statute, or law in question, be rationally related to a
legitimate government objective. Under rational basis review, the statute
requiring early retirement easily met this test.174
The Murgia holding, calling for a rational basis standard with respect to
equal protection and age discrimination, received support throughout the
years. The Supreme Court had a chance to change the standard in 1979
while hearing another forced retirement case. 175 The Court in this case
affirmed Murgia reiterating that the rational basis standard was the correct
standard for age classification cases. Furthermore, the Court found that
forcing retirement at the age of sixty was a legitimate and substantial goal
of Congress because it is necessary that the employees be mentally and
physically competent.176  State courts also supported the Murgia
holding.177 In O'Neil, the Supreme Court of Missouri "blindly followed the
Supreme Court of the United States."' 78 While the rational basis standard
does not completely bar age discrimination claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection provisions, it makes it difficult for one to be
successful, and the Courts have made it clear that the rational basis
standard is the proper standard.
The current standard for age discrimination set forth by Murgia is
outdated and should be replaced by the intermediate standard. This will
allow not only potential NBA athletes, but also others discriminated against
on the basis of age to have more protection. When Murgia was decided, a
few months passed before a middle level scrutiny was created.' 79 At the
171 Id at 309-310.
172 See id. at 313 (quoting U.S. v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
173 See id. at 314 (noting that age discrimination requires a relatively relaxed standard).
174 See id. ("This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is a peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable
one."); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
175 See generally, Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (following the Murgia holding and
applying rational basis review).
176 See Steiner, supra note 81, at 282 (citing Vance, 440 U.S. at 97).
177 See O'Neil v Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978) (involving a statute that requires one to retire
at the age of seventy, with the plaintiff alleging that the statute deprived him of his right to pursue his
livelihood); see also Nagle v. Haw. State Teachers Ass'n, 63 Haw. 389, 394 (1981).
178 Steiner, supra note 81, at 284.
179 Id. at 293 (discussing the reasons why the Murgia standard should be re-evaluated and
changed); see generally Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A
Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213 (2010) (discussing courts
applications of intermediate scrutiny).
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time, the Murgia Court had to choose between strict scrutiny requiring
proof that the classification is narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling
state interest, or rational basis review. However, Craig v. Boren adopted
an intermediate scrutiny standard, requiring proof that the classification is
substantially related to an important state interest.180 The level of scrutiny
applied to equal protection claims based on age discrimination should be
the intermediate level because while under current law employment is not a
fundamental right, it still ranks among the most important of one's personal
concerns.181 A claim of an equal protection violation of a fundamental right
would trigger the strict scrutiny standard. Regardless of whether this right
is fundamental, "'the right of the individual to engage in any of the
common occupations of life' has been asserted by the Supreme Court as a
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 182 Age is an immutable
characteristic, one which cannot be controlled, like gender. Gender, or sex-
based classifications trigger the intermediate scrutiny standard, and age
should do the same.
In order for these athletes to have a claim against the age limit of the
NBA draft rules, the age eligibility requirement would have to be construed
as being enforced by the state. In virtually all litigation in which an
individual argues that his constitutional rights have been violated, the court
can grant relief only if it finds that there has been state action. There are
three ways to prove state action. First, if the state delegates its power for
one to perform a public function to a private person.183 Second, if the state
becomes inextricably entangled with the private person in that their
separate entities are lost.184 Third, if the state coerces or strongly
encourages the private action in that the private person loses its power of
180 See Steiner, supra note 81, at 273 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 190) (adopting new middle level of
scrutiny); see also Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 13 N.Y.3d 35, 48-49 (N.Y. C.A. 2009) (citing
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1973)).
181 See Vance, 440 U.S. at 113; see generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding
fundamental the women's right to choose between giving birth and abortion); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (holding that the right of education was not fundamental).
182 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 322 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
572 (1972)) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
183 See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945) (finding that the more an owner opens
up his property for use by the public, for his own advantage, the more his rights become circumscribed
by the state and the constitutional rights of those who use the property); Amalgamated Food Emp.'s
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968).
184 See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (deciding state action
because the financial wherewithal to run the parking facility was dependent on the public); Sheila Suess
Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private
Partnerships (March 2001) (unpublished law review article, George Mason University) (on file with
George Mason Civil Rights Law Review).
2012]1 44 1
JOURNALOFCIVILRIGH75& ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 26:2
voluntary choice.' 85
The most relevant of the three with regards to the NBA's age eligibility
requirement is the second, where a state becomes entangled with the
private person. This prong can be seen in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking.186 In Burton, the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant within a
parking building, owned by Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of
Delaware, refused to serve the plaintiff because he was black.187 The
plaintiff alleged that the refusal was a violation of his rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.188 The Supreme
Court of Delaware held that this act was "purely private" and that the
action was not state action.189 The Supreme Court ultimately found that the
relationship between the restaurant and the parking facility was enough to
constitute the Coffee Shoppe's acts as state action. The Court reasoned that
because the land and building were publicly owned, upkeep and
maintenance of the building were payable out of public funds and because
the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to
a public parking service, there is a degree of state participation and
involvement.190
The state action requirement necessary to make a claim under equal
protection can be met with respect to an NBA franchise.191 State action can
be proven through the entanglement prong. The States are intricately
involved with each of their teams, allotting tax revenue in order to build
stadiums. Similarly to Burton, any maintenance or upkeep of the stadiums
will be publicly funded. Furthermore, the State provides teams with the
venue and money to throw parades when the teams win championships.
Additional entanglement between the private entity and the state can be
seen through the states taking on the identity of the sports teams as fans and
followers of that specific team.192
Even if the standard is not changed, Baccus v. Karger gives high school
185 See generally Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of the
restrictive covenant in deeds of residential property would constitute state action, and therefore be in
violation of the 1 4 'h Amendment); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
186 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
187 Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
188 Id.
189 See id.
190 See id. at 723-24.
191 See Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 606-07 (noting the different ways that the NBA can be seen as
being involved in state action); see also Karen Martin Dean, Can The NBA Punish Dennis Rodman? An
Analysis ofFirst Amendment Rights in Professional Basketball, 23 VT. L. REv. 157, 166 (1998).
192 Id; see Stephen M. McKelvey, Commercial "Branding": The Final Frontier or False Start for
Athletes' Use of Temporary Tattoos as Body Billboards, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 1, 29-30
(2003).
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basketball stars, and others discriminated against on the basis of age, a
glimmer of hope that the rational basis standard can be defeated. The
plaintiff in Baccus was considered a child prodigy and began studying law
at the age of fourteen, receiving his Juris Doctor when he was seventeen
years old.193 Planning to sit for the bar exam, having not yet reached
twenty-one years of age, the plaintiffs application to take the exam was
denied. 194  The plaintiff claimed undue hardship, arguing that his
accelerated studies will now be forever meaningless and that he is in the
best position to pass the bar immediately following completion of law
school. 195 The defendants argued that in order to sit for the bar, the age
requirement is necessary because one must be mature enough to practice
law.196 The defendants also argued that a person under the age of eighteen
does not possess enough maturity to "sufficiently appreciate and
understand the myriad factors and complexities found in the law and the
critical importance of attorneys in practicing law and counseling
clients."1 97
While the requirement of being twenty one years of age to sit for the bar
examination passed the rational basis review, the court found that requiring
one to be at least eighteen before beginning law school would not pass
rational basis review. 198 The court states that law schools are not in the
"maturity business" and that a law school's purpose is to teach its students
the principles of the law.199 The fact that Baccus was approved for
acceptance by a law school and completed the course of study proves that
he is "entitled to the same academic recognition achieved by his older,
fellow graduates." 200 Ultimately, the court found that this age restriction
was arbitrary, which is the only instance in which the court could strike
down the criteria.201 This case represents a plaintiff overcoming the
rational basis standard, which usually calls for great deference to the
193 Baccus v. Karger, 692 F. Supp. 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the requirement that the
bar applicant be at least 18 years old to begin the study of law does not pass the rational basis standard,
and is unconstitutional).
194 Id. at 293.
195 See id. at 292.
196 See id. at 294 (holding that an age threshold can be rationally related to maturity).
197 Id. at 298.
198 See id at 298 ("Simply put, we are not satisfied that this requirement rationally advances New
York's legitimate interest in protecting the public from the pitfalls of professional immaturity.").
199 See id at 299.
200 Id.
201 See id. at 293 (discussing the only instance in which it would be necessary to strike down a
statute).
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defendant.202
This case echoes the same problems with the NBA's age eligibility rules.
The NBA is trying to expand its horizons by going into the "maturity
business" instead of focusing on basketball, and allowing the teams to
make their decisions and assume the risk of whom they choose to represent
their teams.203 It is hard to believe that a twenty year old, "treated like a
god in college before deciding to drop out" is more mature "than an
[eighteen year old] trying to start his professional career right away."204
This paternalistic role that the NBA is taking is unfair, unreasonable, and
completely arbitrary. Protecting younger players from dealing with a
difficult adjustment of playing in high school to playing in the NBA may
be a concern that is none of the NBA's business. The concern should be
that of the individual teams, and the NBA should allow the individual
teams to rely on the "natural selection" of the draft. The best players will
be chosen and those who are not qualified will not be chosen.205 The NBA
should allow these athletes the right to enter the draft, and whether or not
they are chosen depends on their skills and the teams drafting strategy.206
If the players are good enough to play in the NBA, as some have proven to
be, then this may help invalidate the rule.207 What will happen when the
next LeBron James desires to enter the draft but has to wait a year or
maybe two in order to play in the NBA? Will the NBA turn their heads at
the chance of having a once in a lifetime star enter their business, and let
him risk injury at college, or play in Europe?
The NBA's age eligibility requirement is arbitrary. The court in Baccus
asserted it would only strike down a regulation if it was completely
arbitrary. With regards to child labor laws, such laws have withstood
scrutiny because they aim to protect children from harm, resulting in a law
that is not arbitrary.208 In contrast, the success of players in the NBA who
came straight from high school, such as Kobe Bryant and LeBron James,
202 See Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 608-09 (noting that there is a possibility of individuals
overcoming the relaxed standard of rational basis review).
203 See Baccus, 692 F. Supp. at 299; see also McAleavey, supra note 107, at 280 (stating that the
NBA Age Rule is paternalistic and based on unfounded views on immaturity).
204 See Muro, supra note 111.
205 See Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 613 (explaining a possible solution to the NBA age eligibility
problem); see also The Draft Review: 1999 Underclassmen, THEDRAFTREVIEW.COM,
http://thedraftreview.com/index.php?option=com_content&view-article&id=3046:1999-
underclassmen&catid=136:early-entry-underclassmen&Itemid=122 (last visited Sept. 24, 2011)
(showing how teams will draft players they value regardless of age).
206 See Fuhrman, supra note 59, at 613; see also The Draft Review, supra note 205.
207 See Fuhrman supra note 59, at 613 (stating that given the NBA success of those other twenty, a
plaintiff could have a legitimate claim); see also The Draft Review, supra note 205.
208 See Fuhrman, supra, note 59, at 613; see also Baccus, 692 F. Supp. at 293.
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may work against the league's justification of the age requirement,
rendering it arbitrary.209 These are two of the most successful and talented
players in the game, and neither needed to wait an extra year after
graduating high school to enter the draft. If there is proof that those players
who skip college do not deteriorate the game of basketball, then the NBA
will have a hard time explaining its reasoning for the eligibility
requirement. The success of these players makes the classification
arbitrary, and proves that the legitimate goal of denying them the right to
play will be obsolete.
IV. SOLUTION To THE PROBLEM
A. The Collective Bargaining Process and Paternalism
Aside from the age eligibility rule itself, there are two basic problems
that need to be rectified in order for the NBA to have a fairer draft process.
The first is the lack of representatives that the potential college athletes
have in the collective bargaining process. 210 The second is the paternalistic
role that the NBA is playing, or attempting to play in the team strategies
and risk taking in drafting players for their teams.
It has been determined that it is common for industries to make decisions
about potential or future employees in their collective bargaining
agreements. 2 11 However it would behoove the NBA to start a new trend, by
including a group of representatives that could speak on behalf of the
incoming class of players. The NBA is different than any other industry,
aside from other athletic leagues, in that they gain much more publicity
than do employers in the regular workplace. The NBA would be sending a
message all around the country that they care about potential and future
workers, and that they deserve to be heard. Even if this group of
representatives had less to say than the group of current players and league
owners, it would still be better than having no say in the matter whatsoever.
The second problem the NBA has is that they do not let the teams take
the risks and determine their own strategy for drafting players. In all other
aspects of the game, the team can decide who they want on their team
through free agency, and trades. However when it comes to drafting, the
NBA is limiting the pool. The NBA should allow the teams to choose and
determine who is and is not ready for the NBA. Let the teams, the general
209 See Fuhrman, supra, note 59, at 613; see also Baccus, 692 F. Supp. at 293.




managers, and the coaches assume the risk of selecting a player directly out
of high school. The NBA should allow the players to play in the NBA
depending on their skills and talents, not their age.
One final possible solution would be to create a better developmental
league than the one already in place. 212 The current NBA developmental
league drafts players from colleges, and the NBA has scouts attend the
games and make determinations as to whether any players are ready to
enter the NBA.213 The NBA should create a system like the MLB farm
system, where the teams draft the players and if they believe they are not
ready for the NBA they can play in the developmental league under
contract with their respective team. This would avoid denying these
potential stars their right to obtain gainful employment because they would
be playing basketball, and making money doing so, before being able to
make the jump to the NBA.
CONCLUSION
The NBA has enforced an arbitrary age limit on potential NBA stars,
differing from many other sports that do not have age restrictions, such as
hockey, boxing, and NASCAR.214 The differences between these sports
and the NBA are quite apparent in terms of physicality of the sport and the
potential risk of injury. Furthermore, the NFL, which enforces an age
requirement for players to enter the draft, is one of the most physically
dangerous sports in the country, making for a better reason as to why the
age limit may be necessary in the NFL, but not in the NBA.
Additionally, disallowing these teenage athletes to work because they are
too young should be classified as reverse age discrimination. While the
ADEA has been interpreted as applying only to those individuals age forty
and over, the statute clearly indicates that discriminating on the basis of age
is prohibited. 215 Regardless of the interpretation of the ADEA, State Law
claims of reverse age discrimination can still succeed. The ADEA does not
212 See NBA D-league 101, NBA NEws, http://www.nba.con/dleague/news/nbadleague_101.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2011); see also Daniel Reed, The NBA D-League, Where Amazing Begins,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-reed/the-nba-d-league-
where-am b 432249.html (stating that the NBA D-League is the NBA's minor league, and the most
heavily scouted source for basketball talent).
213 See Reed, supra note 212 (discussing the basics of how the D-league works); see also Mike
Lowe, With Plenty of Talent, D League Making Plans, MAINE TODAY, Oct. 9,2011, at Cl, available at
http://www.pressherald.com/sports/with-plenty-of-talent-d-league-making-plans_2011-10-09.html
(discussing the link between the D-league and NBA recruitment).
214 See discussion infra Part II.
215 See 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(1); see also Hahn v. Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 942 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
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preempt state law, and two very influential states; New Jersey and
California have found that reverse age discrimination cases can succeed. 216
Furthermore, depriving these individuals of their right to obtain gainful
employment is a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
right, and should be deemed unconstitutional. While the standard set forth
by Murgia seems to make it difficult for one to succeed on an equal
protection claim, there are four reasons for the players seeking employment
to maintain hope. First, the standard in Murgia is old and possibly
outdated. Second, the rational basis standard was applied to age
discrimination a few months before the intermediate standard was
created.217 Third, the cases in which age discrimination was decided by
applying the rational basis standard dealt with retirement and/or health
benefits, employees who already were employed. In the case of the high
school athletes, they are being denied the right to work completely. Lastly,
the New Jersey Court in Baccus showed that this rational basis standard
can be overcome when the requirement is arbitrary. 218
In Brandon's rookie season in the NBA, he scored fifty-five points in
one game, becoming the youngest player ever to score over fifty points in
his rookie season.219 Ultimately, after his season playing overseas had
ended, Brandon Jennings was drafted tenth overall in the 2009 NBA draft,
and is now an up and coming star in the league.220 Even though Brandon
Jennings got the experience and maturity that he needed from playing
overseas, and avoided the issue that stands in the face of many other
potential NBA players, many others may not have this opportunity. Some
players will choose to go to college for a year, and then make the jump to
the NBA. Some players will go to college for more than one year, until
they believe they are ready for the NBA.
Others may do neither, contemplating other possibilities such as taking
216 See discussion infra Part III.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See Ryan Christopher DeVault, Brandon Jennings' 55 points sets Bucks Rookie Record:
Milwaukee Bucks' Guard Brandon Jennings Scored 55 Points in Just his 7'h Game, YAHOO VOICES
(Nov. 15, 2009),
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2393372/brandon jennings_55_point game sets.html; see
also Kevin Pelton, A Special Night. Brandon Jennings' Big Game, BASKETBALL PROSPECTUS (Nov. 15,
2009),
http://www.basketballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=780&mode=print&nocache= 1316886577.
220 See Elias Sports Bureau, Brandon Jennings Stats, ESPN,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/players/profile?playerld=3997 (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (finding that
Brandon Jennings earned 15.8 points 5.3 assists, and 1.4 steals per game); see also 2009 NBA Draft
Results, MY NBA DRAFT, http://www.mynbadraft.com/2009-NBA-Draft-Results/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2011).
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legal action. Brandon Jennings may or may not have started a trend of high
school athletes traveling overseas for a year to play basketball before
playing in the NBA. Perhaps another potential NBA all star will start a
trend of their own; challenging the NBA's age eligibility rules on new
grounds.
